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THE STUDENT AS UNIVERSITY RESIDENT 
BY WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE* 
I. A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION THAT FAILS 
T HE articles in this symposium move through a series of topics each of which considers a different aspect of the relationship 
between the student and the university. This division of topics, dis-
tinguishing the student as a university resident from the student as 
a private citizen, virtually implies that useful legal distinctions can 
be drawn according to the capacity in which a student may act and the 
place within which the university presumes to assert its authority. 
Thus, it may be suggested, while the student remains as a resident 
within the campus, he is subject to the plenary authority of the uni-
versity which may appropriately restrict academic residency to those 
agreeable to its rules. Accordingly, on-campus conduct not in con-
formity with the rules may forfeit the student's residency. On the 
other hand, once the student moves away from the campus he acts as 
a private citizen bound only by laws applicable to citizens in gen-
eral. Like other unattached citizens, however, he is no longer subject 
to any extraterritorial claims of the university whose jurisdiction is 
confined to its own precinct, the campus. 
The resident-citizen distinction appears to be fair to the student 
and fair to the university as well. It releases the student off the 
campus from worry that he is less free than other citizens, and it 
releases the university from concern that it is less free than other 
property owners. If one readily accepts the campus relationship as 
one of ownership and tenancy, moreover, the university's claim of 
plenary on-campus authority seems to be entirely reasonable and 
wholly straightforward. The essential core of property ownership 
consists of the power to exclude and the concomitant authority to 
expel those who seek to remain in defiance of the owner's rules or 
wishes. Where the property is placed in the hands of trustees who 
are given legal authority by the state or a private benefactor to pro-
mulgate rules for the general governance of the institution, it is 
utterly unremarkable that those who are admitted as academic resi-
dents should expect to abide by all campus rules which condition 
their residency. No significant legal problem would appear to arise 
so long as the rules are confined to the campus itself and so long 
*Professor of Law, Duke University. 
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as they offend no state law or public policy otherwise applicable 
to landholders and educational institutions in general. The uni-
versity does not attempt to force anyone to attend, and, unlike the 
situation in secondary education, the student is not compelled by law 
to matriculate. As a free agent who voluntarily applies and may 
just as readily abandon the university whenever he feels like it, the 
student resident must reasonably expect to conform to the trustees' 
regulations while he is on university property. 
If the residential relationship of the student is viewed as one 
of contract, involving private agreements respecting access to and 
use of campus services and facilities, again we seem to reach the 
same result. Indeed, the free market contract model of comparison 
is especially attractive because it also provides an answer to those 
who would criticize the fairness, and not merely the legality, of 
campus rules. Within the free market contract model, for instance, 
diversity among colleges and their differing sets of rules is expect-
able and desirable. Competition of colleges offering different aca-
demic life styles maximizes consumer satisfaction by providing a 
broad range of alternatives capable of responding to the differing 
preferences of the students. A given college rule - whether it re-
quires all students to dress alike, whether it forbids social fraternities, 
or something else again - requires no special defense; the success 
or failure of the college to attract and to hold students against the 
competition of the colleges offering different academic life styles 
is itself the best and the only secure measure of the wisdom of its 
rules. Certainly this seems eminently sensible, at least where the 
college formulates its rules only in terms of on-campus conduct 
and does not attempt to extort contractual concessions to rules af-
fecting the off-campus citizenship prerogatives of those who enroll 
with it. So long as the legal requisites of a contract are satisfied 
(e.g., contractual capacity, mutual assent, conscionability of specific 
terms), there would seem to be little basis for a lawyer to reproach 
the rules regime of any given college.1 Were it not primarily for 
1 Yet, while there may be some merit still remaining in treating the legal student-
college relation as one of contract (e.g., where in fact the student could select any 
of several different kinds of colleges and where the rules or general conditions of 
each are well known to him in advance), this view needs far greater judicial super-
vision than it has received thus far. Typical student cases involving private colleges 
have manifested a shocking indifference to a number of considerations which have 
tempered the law of contracts even in more commercial fields such as insurance 
and sales. See, e.g., University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App. 
Fla. 1966); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925); Gott v. Berea 
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 
2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 
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certain constitutional protections applicable to students as citizens, 
moreover, there would be little amiss were a college to bind its 
students contractually to fulfill any number of promises respecting 
their off-campus conduct as well. 
In both respects- the property analogy and the contract 
analogy - the public as well as private universities would thus 
appear to possess plenary authority on campus. As Mr. Justice 
Holmes observed in rejecting the complaint of a person refused a 
permit to speak in the Boston Common and who sought to argue 
that the mayor had accordingly violated his freedom of speech: 
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public 
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement 
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a 
private house to forbid it in his house.2 
231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 
A. 220 (1923). 
The rules which a student "contracts" to observe are altogether nonnegotiable, 
and there is in fact an absence of bargaining. The majority of "sellers" uniformly 
employ a self-serving clause reserving the right to terminate the relation at will 
according to standards they unilaterally determine pursuant to a vague "good con-
duct" rule. Thus, the nonnegotiability of terms is compounded by the real lack of 
shopping alternatives, the inequality of the parties in fixing terms, parallel practices 
among sellers, and the impotency of individual applicants to affect terms. The 
contracts are purely on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Frequently, the student has little 
idea of the terms of his contract in advance of matriculating, as he more often 
than not becomes enrolled before being presented with any sort of handbook which 
states the conditions of his attendance. Occasionally, he does not receive the handbook 
at all. Its provisions are typically subject to change at the sole pleasure of the 
college. Moreover, the student may be a minor when he enrolls, and while he may 
thus avoid the contract based on his own incapacity, he may also be unable to 
enforce it until he becomes of age. 
One might expect, as a consequence, that the courts would be more inclined 
than they have been to interpret vague rules against the university as the draftsman 
and stronger party and void those rules which appear to be unconscionable. See, 
e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
Willard Van Dyke Productions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 
N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963). See also, Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and 
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 ( 1943) ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); 
Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. 
REv. 1178 (1964); Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 731 ( 1943) ; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700 ( 1939). 
Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-302. 
There are still other considerations which strain the private contract model 
of student-college relations, even from the college's perspective. Thus, the "consid-
eration" furnished by the student in the form of tuition and fees frequentlv defrays 
less than one-half of the (average) cost of educating him- a fact which simply 
underscores the larger fact that colleges are not commercial, profit-seeking under-
takings which deal with students at arm's length. Rather, they may be heavily 
subsidized charitable corporations established primarily for the benefit of the 
students and administered by trustees. Such a difference in the basic view of the 
student-college relationship should incline the courts to look again at the rules 
structure to review the decisions of the trustees and their subordinates against a high 
standard of fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries, and not in terms of permissible 
clauses in an arm's-length contract. See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its 
Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. L.]. 643 (1966); Seavy, Dismissal of Stu-
dents: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 ( 1957). 
2 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), affd, 167 U.S. 
43 (1897). 
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Similarly, when the state undertakes to establish a college, it may 
be seen to operate in the capacity of a proprietor who is subject 
only to the usual rules of law respecting the use of his own property 
and not subject to constitutional norms which affect him only when 
he, acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity, at-
tempts to regulate private conduct removed from his property. 
For all of its hoary tradition, however, the on-campus/off-
campus distinction is unsound, and the property or contract analogies 
are very insecure as a matter of law.8 Issues of constitutional law 
to one side, the appropriateness of certain rules in an institution pre-
suming to call itself "academic" would still be open to discussion; 
surely it is proper to suggest that truly academic institutions serve 
special, vital, and limited functions which may be undermined and 
disserved by rules which inhibit either academic or nonacademic 
freedom either on campus or off campus - rules which are, inci-
dentally, wholly inessential to the orderly operation of a university. 
In contemplation of evolved constitutional law, moreover, all such 
models are subordinate to constitutional norms whenever the in-
stitution is so significantly aided by government that its rulemaking 
authority partakes of governmental power.4 Mr. Justice Holmes' 
distinction between the state acting in a governmental capacity and 
the state acting in a proprietary capacity has been substantially aban-
3 See note 1 supra. 
• Green v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), vacated in part, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). 
Compare University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 
1966), with Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 ( 1961) (Pri-
vately operated restaurant under arm's-length lease with public parking authority 
subject to equal protection clause. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances 
can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 ( 1950) 
("When authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exer-
cise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its 
exercise by Government itself."); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 ( 1946) 
(Privately owned company town subject to fourteenth amendment. "We do not agree 
that the corporation's property interests settle the question .... The more an owner, 
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more 
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those 
who use it."); Eaton v. Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 '(4th Cir. 1964) (private hospital 
receiving federal aid and performing "public function" subject to fourteenth amend-
ment). See generalJ,Y A. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION 
(1957); Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
39 ( 1967); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Actio11, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 28-36 ( 1961); 
Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial Review of Unive1·sity Expul-
sions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 ( 1963). 
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doned.5 Under either of these models- the university as an academic 
institution and the university as an instrumentality of government 
subject to constitutional restrictions on behalf of personal liberty -
the 100 percent on-campus/off-campus description of university 
jurisdiction will not stand up. 
Specific illustrations of constitutional control of the publicly 
supported college as landholder, trustee, or contractual promisee 
are readily available. A private property holder need not grant per-
mission that his land or buildings be available to students or to 
anyone else as a place to hold meetings for discussing public issues, 
hearing guest speakers, or assembling to express some grievance 
(least of all against the property holder himself), whether or not 
such assemblies were orderly, whether or not such meetings did 
not conflict with anything else the property holder intended to do 
at the time, and whether or not the property holder sometimes al-
lowed such meetings to be held on his property by people whose 
ideas or backgrounds he happened to favor. If he elected to lease 
the property to a group of persons, moreover, he could readily evict 
them in the event they breached a covenant not to hold such meet-
ings. 
If the property holder is placed in a position of power through 
an exercise of _?ublic largess (as through the expenditure of tax rev-
enue in the operation of a college or university), however, his au-
thority is hedged by constitutional restraints which protect "the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances," and which forbid him to deny equal protection of such 
5See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 404 ( 1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of 
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions 
upon a benefit or privilege."); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 ( 1952); Frost 
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 '( 1926) ("It would 
be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words 
of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under 
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the 
state threatens otherwise to withhold .... It is inconceivable that guarantees embed-
ded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of exist-
ence.") ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). For 
discussions of this subject see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional 
Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 { 193 5) ; Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public 
Sector: justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 
( 1965) ; O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings 
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.]. 
733 (1964); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 
HARV. l. REV. 1595 (1960). 
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rights. 6 Accordingly, on-campus bans against guest speakers have 
been enjoined where the rule supporting the ban was so vague as 
to reserve carte blanche censorship to the administration 7 and where 
the university classified speakers as acceptable or unacceptable in 
terms of their political affiliations,8 their unrelated conduct before 
congressional committees,9 or their having been subject to an un-
adjudicated criminal charge - even one of murder or homosexual 
soliciting.10 Where no physical disorder is imminent, where there 
is no substantial basis for supposing that the speaker will himself 
violate the law or incite others to a violation in the course of his 
remarks, where the facilities are otherwise available and other 
guest speakers are generally allowed on campus, the student residents 
interested in hearing a given speaker on campus may not be 
denied. Moreover, peaceful political expression or orderly and 
nondisruptive assemblies on campus by students meeting to express 
some felt grievance against the college itself is a protected form 
6 See authorities cited notes 4, 5 supra. Once it is clear that the property owner's 
operation is sufficiently pervaded with governmental presence as to make the Consti-
tution apply, it is appropriate to suggest that one can no more rely on the right-
privilege distinction than can the government itself. 
7 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) ("known member of the 
Communist Party," "known to advocate the overthrow of government" held void for 
vagueness). The current speaker regulation in force at the University of Mississippi is 
probably vulnerable on the same basis, (see Note, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban: 
Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Mrss. L.J. 
488 ( 1967) ), as is the Louisiana statute (see 42 TuL. L. REv. 394 ( 1968) ). An anti-
demonstration rule in South Carolina was also recently held void for vagueness, prior 
restraint, and inadequate standards, in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 
F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). It is clear that special first amendment concerns require 
a degree of clarity, precision, standards, and specificity in this area considerably in 
excess of what may be demanded of other types of rules as a matter of due process. 
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (and cases cited 
therein); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). For other discussions of consti-
tutional limitations on speaker control see Pollitt, Campus Censorship: Statute Bar-
ring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REV. 179 ( 1963); Van 
Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 
111 U. PA. L. REv. 328 (1963). 
8Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); 
Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also 
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 ( 1967) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 
(1937). 
9 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (special regulation of any 
speaker having utilized his privilege against self-incrimination before a state or federal 
investigating committee, held invalid as an unconstitutional condition upon the use 
of the privilege) . 
10 Student Liberal Fed'n v. Louisiana State Univ., Civil No. 68-300 (E.D. La., Feb. 13, 
1968); Stacy v. Williams, Civil No. WC 6725 (N.D. Miss., June 30, 1967) '(involv-
ing a temporary restraining order to enable the speaker to appear, but evidently on 
the basis that his contract antedated the speaker's rule rather than on a free speech 
or equal protection basis). 
588 DENVER LAW JOURNAL VoL. 45 
of expression.11 Nor may the college mute criticism of itself by 
forbidding critical student comment in the campus newspaper.12 
In all of these respects, university government is subject to a sub-
stantial degree of constraint similar to that which limits the civil 
government from which the university derives its powers. As a 
campus constituent of that university government, the student does 
not forfeit his freedom of speech and cannot be made to barter it 
away as a condition of being admitted or of remaining.13 
Additional illustrations might be provided to make the point 
that a student cannot be made to leave his rights as a citizen outside 
the college's doors. Virtually all colleges today provide at least some 
on-campus lodgings for students. Unlike the situation respecting the 
private landlord who may contractually reserve a right to enter and 
inspect the premises at any time and for reasons satisfactory only 
to himself, however, it is exceedingly likely that the fourth amend-
ment's interdiction of "unreasonable searches and seizures" restricts 
colleges receiving substantial public support from imposing such 
sweeping conditions upon a student's privacy as those which may 
be reserved by contract to a private landlord. Random fishing expe-
ditions without warrant and without an excusable emergency, result-
ing in the seizure of things subsequently introduced in a disciplinary 
hearing to provide a basis for expelling the student, are probably 
11 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). See 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (classroom wearing of "Freedom" 
buttons protected by first amendment). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229 (1963}; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 
1967}, cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968}. 
But distractingly raucous demonstrations or other modes of expression which 
directly disrupt or obstruct authorized activities on campus may appropriately be 
punished. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 '(5th Cir. 1966); 
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.W. Va. 1968}; Zanders v. Louisiana 
State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968}; lluttny v. Smiley, 281 F. 
Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 
1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 
( 1967) ; in re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 ( 1966). And certain 
facilities may probably be closed altogether to demonstrations, without regard to 
whether the demonstration would have been orderly. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 
U.S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
u.s. 559 ( 1965). 
12 See Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), final 
decision postponed on appeal, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1968}. See also Pickering v. 
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 ( 1968), holding that a teacher may not be fired 
because of partially false statements critical of the trustees which appeared in a letter 
to the editor published in a regular newspaper and which concerned an issue of gen-
eral public interest. 
13 See authorities cited note 5 supra. See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618 
(M.D. Ala. 1967) ("A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitu-
tionally protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to his attending a 
state-supported institution."). 
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forbidden. 14 The fact that the premises, and perhaps the very rooms 
themselves, may be owned by the state does not displace the fourth 
amendment or eliminate a student-citizen's right to due process 
respecting the manner in which evidence used against him has been 
seized. The fourteenth amendment makes no broad distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" state action, and a state 
university must continue to observe standards of constitutional fair-
ness even when acting as a proprietor.15 Indeed, in the broader 
context of social trends, it should shock us to suppose that the right 
of privacy might not extend to governmentally owned or operated 
residences. Given the trend in housing generally, with an ever 
larger fraction of living places either owned by government (as in 
public housing) or underwritten by government (as through VA, 
FHA, and FNMA), any view which would limit the constitutional 
right of privacy to privately owned dwellings would effectively 
shrink the right itself, removing it from an ever larger percentage 
of the whole population, and seriously subordinating them to the 
risks so explicit in George Orwell's 1984. Because of the trend toward 
developing ever more on-campus living units for students, we should 
be even more concerned as academicians not to act in ways which 
unintentionally teach our students that we ourselves are the intruding 
Big Brother. 
Finally, norms of constitutional law have been applied with 
increasing frequency to the procedure, even more than to the sub-
stance, of college discipline. Because this subject has been more 
thoroughly explored elsewhere than any other subject/ 6 I shall 
consider it only briefly - but well enough to reiterate the essential 
point respecting the inadequacy of contractual and property analo-
gtes. 
In ordering the reinstatement of university students dismissed 
14 People v. Overton, 51 Misc. 2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 {1966) {fourth amendment's 
ban against unreasonable search extends to student's school locker, and vice principal 
may not grant consent to police search); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy 
State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) {fourth amendment applied to stu-
dent's on-campus room, search upheld on "reasonable" cause, dicta imply that fishing 
expedition search would taint evidence seized pursuant thereto). See also Camara v. 
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) {housing code regulation providing for warrant-
less administrative searches struck down); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 
260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 ( 1967) {welfare payments cannot be condi-
tioned on consent to submit to warrantless searches). See generally Note, The Fourth 
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968). 
15 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1458-64 (1968). 
16 The following text on procedural due process is substantially reproduced from my own 
article, Van Alstyne, The judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. 
FLA. L. REv. 290 ( 1968), where references to other writings on the same subject are 
provided. (See also Selected Bibliography on Student Rights, appendix to this article.) 
I regret the duplication, but could scarcely see any way of avoiding it. 
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without hearing for alleged participation in off-campus demon-
strations, a federal court of appeals observed in 1961: 
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case 
is the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in 
which the plaintiffs were students in good standing. It requires no 
argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic 
to civilized society. Without sufficient education the plaintiffs 
would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to 
the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and 
responsibilities of good citizens.l7 
In view of the importance of the students' interest which was 
placed in jeopardy by the threat to dismiss them, the court required 
that such action must not be taken without the institutional observ-
ance of certain minimal procedural safeguards which would lessen 
the likelihood of errors and prejudice. Subsequent cases have made 
clear that the degree of quasi-judicial formality in college disciplinary 
proceedings need only be proportioned to the gravity of the offense, 
and that no college need fear that every alleged infraction, no mat-
ter how minor the penalty, must be determined in a cumbersome 
and divisive adversary proceeding.18 When the consequences at-
tached to the alleged misconduct are very serious to the student's 
future, however, an increasing number of procedural requirements 
must correspondingly be observed. In the gravest cases (e.g., those 
involving expulsion, long-term suspension, widely available recorda-
tion of offenses carrying a high degree of popular stigma), the col-
lege must probably proceed with at least as much care as is now 
required of a juvenile court - especially as so many of its students 
are not juveniles and not at all subject to the fading rationale of 
in loco parentis. 
The proposition that even minors cannot be disciplined in a 
manner affecting substantial interests without the observance of pro-
cedural due process was specifically affirmed by the Supreme Court 
only last year. In prospectively requiring juvenile courts to improve 
the judicial nature of their proceedings, the Court declared: 
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process 
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfair-
ness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and 
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the pri-
mary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the 
basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the 
17 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 ( 1961). See also Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1961). 
18 Compare Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 ( 1961), 
with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 ( 1959). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comrn. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 ( 1951). 
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rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state 
may exercise. 
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution 
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care 
implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the 
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.19 
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The jettisoning of in loco parentis was, it may be suggested, 
long overdue in any case. For one thing, the mean age of American 
college students is more than 21 years, and there are, in fact, more 
students over the age of 30 than younger than the age of 18.20 Even 
in Blackstone's time, the doctrine did not apply to persons over 21.21 
For another thing, it is unrealistic to assume that relatively imperson-
al and large-scale institutions can act in each case with the same 
degree of solicitous concern as a parent reflects in the intimacy of 
his own home. The parent is doubtless restrained in tempering dis-
cipline with love and concern which one expects of a father or 
mother, while the institution cannot hope to reflect the same in-
tense degree of emotional identification with those in attendance, 
no matter how well it may intend to do so. The institution is also 
subject to different practical concerns - to keep its eye on reaction 
by the local press, disgruntlement among alumni, dissatisfaction 
among benefactors, and others whose practical influence combine 
to bring about an administrative perspective less loving and more 
divided than a mother has for her own son or daughter. It simply 
blinks at reality to treat the mother and the college as one and the 
same in drawing legal analogies, no matter how frequently one refers 
to his alma mater for other purposes. Finally, there is this to be 
said: a parent's disciplinary authority does not extend to the power 
literally to expel a dependent minor from his own home, but to 
lesser penalties only. Yet, the typical sanction imposed by the al-
leged surrogate parent, a college, is the sanction of expulsion itself 
- with all of the serious consequences to the student's future al-
ready noted above. As the analogy of in loco parentis is in many 
ways false in fact, we need not be surprised nor alarmed that it is 
now being discarded.22 Large-scale collegiate operations, the hetero-
19 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-20, 27-28 ( 1967). 
20 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 110, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 ( 1961). 
21 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. 
22 See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) ("We agree with 
the students that the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university 
community."); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 463, 469 ( 1967) ("For constitutional purposes, the better approach, as indi-
cated in Dixon, recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in loco 
parentis in relation to their students."). 
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geneity of their student bodies, the varying ages of their students, 
the irreducible impersonality of their operation, and the grave con-
sequences of their disciplinary proceedings, all support the height-
ened requirements of greater procedural fairplay in their treatment 
of alleged violators of their rules. The immediate, practical, and 
constitutional result of these phenomena is this: colleges and uni-
versities may no longer enforce their rules through sanctions seri-
ously jeopardizing a student's career in the absence of procedures 
which are fundamentally fair. The essential elements of fair pro-
cedure include (but may not be limited to) the following require-
ments: 
( 1) Serious disciplinary action may not be taken in the absence 
of published rules which: 
(a) are not "so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation" ·23 and 
' 
23 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Hammond 
v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Buckley v. Meng, 
35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Soglin v. Kauffman, Opinion 
and Order No. 67-C-141 (W.D. Wis., Dec. 11, 1967) (General "misconduct" rule 
as applied to demonstrations acknowledged to raise grave first amendment question, 
although temporary restraining order withheld pending fuller hearing. "The consti-
tutional requirement of reasonable specificity and narrowness in rule-making in the 
First Amendment area has not as yet been suspended in non-university society."). 
At the same time, a number of recent federal decisions have not demanded even 
ordinary clarity in rules, and some have upheld student suspensions based merely on 
a wholly undefined "inherent power." See, e.g., Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51 
(D.C. Cit. 1965); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968); 
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttny 
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. 
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. 
App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301 
(Tex. Gv. App. 1959). 
Despite the opinions in these cases, I cannot believe that they are soundly 
reasoned. They are, as Professor William Cohen suggested, highly reminiscent of 
A. P. Herbert's hearty spoof in Rex v. Haddock, in which the accused had jumped 
into the Thames purely for fun, and in which the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed 
his conviction in spite of the fact that no one could find any statute which he had 
violated. The court stated: 
Citizens who take it upon themselves to do unusual actions which attract the 
attention of the police should be careful to bring these actions into one of 
the recognized categories of crimes and offences, for it is intolerable that 
the police should be put to the pains of inventing reasons for finding them 
undesirable .... It is not for me to say what offence the appellant has com-
mitted, but I am satisfied that he has committed some offence, for which he 
has been most properly punished. 
A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE CoMMON LAW 31, 33, 36-37 (4th ed. 
1928). (The concurring judge "said that in his opinion, the appellant had done his 
trousers no good and the offence was damage to property.") 
More seriously, vagueness and ambulatory administrative discretion as well as 
lack of notice of rules are constitutionally vicious, even aside from whether or not 
an individual had reason to suppose that he might subsequently be punished for his 
proposed conduct. The general problem is very well reviewed in Amsterdam, The 
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Collings, Unconstit:t-
lional Un,ertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955). 
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(b) do not depend upon the unqualified discretion of a 
particular administrator for their application.24 
(2) Where the rules are reasonably clear and their application 
does not depend upon uncontrolled discretion, a student still may 
not be seriously disciplined (as by suspension) unless: 
(a) the student charged with an infraction has been fur-
nished with a written statement of the charge adequately in 
advance of a hearing to enable him to prepare (e.g., 10 days) ;25 
(b) the student thus charged "shall be permitted to inspect 
in advance of such hearing any affidavits or exhibits which the 
college intends to submit at the hearing" ;26 
(c) the student is "permitted to have counsel present at 
the hearing to advise [him J" ;27 
(d) the student is "permitted to hear the evidence pre-
sented against [him]," or at least the student should be given 
24 Applied in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 
1967). See also cases cited note 23 supra. 
As a practical guide, colleges should be most clear and confined, and provide 
for the least general administrative discretion with respect to rules applied to first 
amendment interests (i.e., speech, assembly, petitioning, or association). Vague, 
overly broad, or standardless rules in this area are regarded as unconstitutional per se 
due to their chilling effect on these preferred freedoms. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 
389 U.S. 241 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04, 608-10 
( 1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 378 U.S. 127 ( 1964); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. 
Supp. 486 (M.DN.C. 1968). Specificity and notice of the rules may also be demanded 
under circumstances where the rule requires those subject to it to take some affirma-
tive act, or to avoid conduct which they might reasonably suppose not to be wrong-
ful. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 '(1957). That is, the more peculiar 
the rule in terms of the ordinary expectations of those bound by it, the more neces-
sary are clarity and notice. For the rest, greater flexibility is doubtless constitutionally 
permissible. Compare Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 ( 1939), and Connally v. 
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), with Nash v. United States, 229 
U.S. 373 (1913), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). A recent attempt 
to provide a reasonably clear list of basic regulations at the University of California 
is described in 17 AMER. CouNCIL oN Eouc. BuLL. No. 8 ( 1968). 
25 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967); Schiff v. 
Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (en bane); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 
2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) '(upholding expulsions based on two days notice); Due v. 
Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (required only that 
charges be read to students at the beginning of the disciplinary hearing). 
26 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
:r7 Id. See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Madera v. 
Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 
1967) (on grounds that the hearing was not essentially disciplinary or penal, but more 
in the nature of counselling to determine the appropriate school in which petitioner 
should be located), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). But see Wasson v. Trow-
bridge, 382 F.2d 807 (1967) (Merchant Marine Academy); Dunmars v. Ailes, 348 
F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (military academy); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 
228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (suspension upheld, notwithstanding refusal to permit 
students to be represented by counsel). See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. 
Colo. 1968) (counsel permitted); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) (counsel permitted); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 
Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (counsel permitted- entire hearing 
procedure unusually comprehensive). 
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the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written 
report on the facts to which each witness testifies ;28 
(e) the student or his attorney may question at the hearing 
any witness who gives evidence against him;29 
(f) those who hear the case "shall determine the facts of 
each case solely on the evidence presented at the hearing" ;30 
(g) "the results and findings of the hearing should be 
presented in a report open to the student's inspection" ;31 
(h) "either side may, at its own expense, make a record 
of the events at the hearing."32 
28 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 '(W.D. Mo. 1967). 
See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 ( 1961) ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 
1961). See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966). 
28Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Gr.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 (1961) indicated that cross-examination may not be required: "This is not 
to imply that a full dress hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is 
required." Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) 
held that a student, but not his counsel, has the right to cross-examine. Yet, in most 
recent cases, disciplinary boards permitted cross-examination by student or counsel. 
See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 
(W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. 
Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. 
of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). There appears to be little reason 
to forbid so customary a function of counsel, reserving to the hearing board substan-
tial discretion to limit counsel's participation to avoid unreasonable delay, harassment, 
or simple grandstanding. None of the cases suggest that formal rules of evidence 
need be observed nor is any such requirement suggested by customary practice in 
adjudicative administrative hearings. 
30 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), which 
heavily qualifies this view and, notwithstanding its cautionary language, accepts what 
is both a questionable and unnecessary practice. "There is no violation of procedural 
due process when a member of a disciplinary body at a university sits on a case after 
he has shared with other members information concerning the facts of a particular 
incident .... This limited combination by a school administrative body of prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory functions is not fundamentally unfair in the absence of a showing 
of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in the outcome of a case." 
It would appear that there may implicitly exist a "personal interest" in the outcome 
under such circumstances, as well as an unfair disadvantage to the student in not 
knowing what alleged information may thus be privately circulated within the hearing 
board. 
31 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 ( 1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 
(W.D .. Mo. 1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). 
33Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). The 
better practice in terms of fairness and economy, at many institutions, is to have a 
simple tape recording of the entire proceedings from which a typed transcript can be 
prepared if necessary. In addition to the cases previously cited, for illustrations of the 
varying degree of procedural due process required by other courts see Woods v. 
Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964), and the marginal due process held to be 
sufficient in Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967), 
aff'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 
1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). Essen-
tially no procedural due process was required in Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. 
Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), on the theory that the university was private and not sub-
ject to the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The case is almost surely in error; even 
before hearing an appeal on the merits, the court of appeals ordered temporary 
reinstatement of the students. Civil No. 1949-67 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 8, 1967). 
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These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the 
standards required by criminal courts in their disposition of offenses 
punishable by fine or short term imprisonment. The comparison is 
not fortuitous because it is now evident that expulsion or exclusion 
from college may, in the long run, disadvantage an individual at 
least as much as a single infraction of a criminal statute. There 
should be no surprise, therefore, that students are entitled at least 
to a similar degree of due process as a suspected pickpocket. Indeed, 
the requisites of due process still evolving from federal decisions 
are substantially less than standards already recommended by pro-
fessional educational associations. The Association of American 
Colleges (representing administrations of nearly 900 colleges), the 
American Association of University Professors (representing about 
86,000 full-time faculty at accredited institutions), the National 
Student Association, the National Association of Student Personnel 
Administrators, the National Association of Women Deans and 
Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher Education 
have recently approved a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms 
of Students which goes considerably beyond the requirements sug-
gested in court decisions. In respect to procedural due process, the 
Joint Statement provides: 
B. Investigation of Student Conduct 
1. Except under extreme emergency circumstances, premises 
occupied by students and the personal possessions of students should 
not be searched unless appropriate authorization has been obtained. 
For premises such as residence halls controlled by the institution, 
an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated to 
whom application should be made before a search is conducted. The 
application should specify the reasons for the search and the objects 
or information sought. The student should be present, if possible, 
during the search. For premises not controlled by the institution, 
the ordinary requirements for lawful search should be followed. 
2. Students detected or arrested in the course of serious viola-
tions of institutional regulations, or infractions of ordinary law, 
should be informed of their rights. No form of harassment should 
be used by institutional representatives to coerce admissions of guilt 
or information about conduct of other suspected persons. 
C. Status of Student Pending Final Action 
Pending action on the charges, the status of a student should 
not be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to attend 
classes suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or 
emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety 
and well-being of students, faculty, or university property. 
D. Hearing Committee Procedures 
When the misconduct may result in serious penalties and if the 
student questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against 
him, he should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing 
before a regularly constituted hearing committee. The following 
suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the requirements 
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of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of 
formality: 
1. The hearing committee should include faculty members or 
students, or, if regularly included or requested by the accused, both 
faculty and student members. No member of the hearing committee 
who is otherwise interested in the particular case should sit in judg-
ment during the proceeding. 
2. The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons 
for the proposed disciplinary action with sufficient particularity, and 
in sufficient time, to insure opportunity to prepare for the hearing. 
3. The student appearing before the hearing committee should 
have the right to be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his 
choice. 
4. The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bring-
ing the charge. 
5. The student should be given an opportunity to testify and 
to present evidence and witnesses. He should have an opportunity 
to hear and question adverse witnesses. In no case should the com-
mittee consider statements against him unless he has been advised 
of their content and of the names of those who made them, and 
unless he has been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable infer-
ences which might otherwise be drawn. 
6. All matters upon which the decision may be based must be 
introduced into evidence at the proceeding before the hearing com-
mittee. The decision should be based solely upon such matters. 
Improperly acquired evidence should not be admitted. 
7. In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest 
and a verbatim record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing. 
8. The decision of the hearing committee should be final, 
subject only to the student's right of appeal to the President or 
ultimately to the governing board of the institution.3 3 
The late (and judicially conservative) Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
once observed that "the history of liberty has largely been the history 
of observance of procedural safeguards."84 So it is with students, as 
with others. 
Somewhat anticlimactically, however, it is necessary to note a 
few additional matters in rendering our treatment of student pro-
cedural due process with complete accuracy: 
( 1) The federal cases involving procedural due process for 
students have been disposed of by courts below the level of the 
United States Supreme Court, and thus their utterances on this subject 
are not necessarily the last word. Indeed, a number of federal courts 
disagree among themselves respecting the requisite degree of college 
due process.85 
33 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 365, 
368 (1967). See also A.C.L.U., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STU· 
DENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (rev. ed. 1965) (This is an earlier ACLU 
statement to which the Joint Statement is indebted.). Comprehensive reports on student 
rights and freedoms have also recently been completed at the University of California, 
Michigan State University, Cornell University, Brown University, University of Wis· 
consin, and Swarthmore College. 
34 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 ( 1943 ). See also Frankfurter's para-
phrasing of the same point in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 ( 1945). 
35 See notes 25-32 supra. 
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(2) On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that additional 
safeguards may be posed by the courts if it appears that complete 
fairness is still not being observed. For instance, it is foreseeable 
that random and unannounced searching of student rooms may be 
forbidden, that students may not be coerced into admissions of mis-
deeds, and that some greater degree of cross-sectional representation 
on hearing boards may eventually be required.86 
(3) A clear distinction will probably continue to be made, how-
ever, respecting campus offenses carrying such relatively insubstantial 
penalties (e.g., social probation, minor fines, loss of auto privileges) 
that formal due process is not demanded and may well be dispensed 
with in the interest of administrative convenience. 
( 4) A distinction will probably continue to be made as well in 
instances where students face the prospect of being dropped due to 
inadequate grades. It is true, of course, that dismissal for academic 
deficiency may be as serious to the student's educational career as 
dismissal for disciplinary reasons, but quasi-judicial procedures are 
generally inadequate as a means of determining whether, for in-
stance, an essay examination should have been graded as a C rather 
than a D. A lay panel may ordinarily lack the competence of second-
guessing grades. Only where the student's complaint alleges egregious 
and almost willfully biased grading may the college be required to 
provide some means of review, and even then the review would 
presumably involve a panel of professors familiar with the subject 
matter of the examination and who would follow a different pro-
cedure than in a disciplinary case.37 
( 5) Finally, disciplinary proceedings are different from counsel-
ling proceedings where the student does not stand in jeopardy of a 
penalty. So long as the counsellor is required to respect the confi-
dentiality of his relationship and acts without power to impose 
punishment, no reason exists to import an adversary or quasi-judicial 
procedure which would undermine the counsellor's essential func-
tions.38 
The ultimate legality of a college rule, then, clearly cannot be 
measured merely by the geography within which it has to operate. 
And it is well that this is so, for it also means, of course, that rules 
which are otherwise reasonable do not become unreasonable merely 
because they may sometimes circumscribe conduct which occurs out-
side the campus itself. A rule appropriately forbidding plagiarism, 
for instance, obviously does not become inappropriate as applied to 
36 On the particular point of random searches see text accompanying note 14 supra. 
37 See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). Compare 
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966). 
38 See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Cosme v. Board 
of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
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a student who copies his paper from a reference work in his own 
home away from campus. A rule restricting student organizations 
from representing that their demonstrations carry the endorsement 
of the college itself does not become invalid when applied to a 
demonstration held downtown; indeed, the more off campus the 
location where such a representation might be made, the more legiti-
mate the rule, due to the greater necessity that the institution shall 
not needlessly suffer from some public misunderstanding. The 
constitutional emphasis, then, turns not upon distinctions between 
students as "citizens" and students as "residents"; it turns, rather, 
upon the larger reasonableness of each rule, and the parameters of 
"reasonableness" are several, not singular. 
II. DUAL RESIDENCY AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Despite what I have said earlier in this article, for certain sig-
nificant purposes a student does reside in several communities at 
once and is made answerable for his conduct to the law of each 
community in turn. His dormitory may have rules affecting his 
conduct as a dormitory resident, his college has overlapping rules 
which affect him as a resident of the college, the city laws may 
overlap both college regulations and dormitory rules, and so on 
right on through some federal statutes. A single act of misconduct 
may accordingly subject a student to a multiplicity of trials and 
punishments, exactly to the extent that the laws of these several 
jurisdictions happen to overlap. Thus, a student who rifles the 
drawer of a roommate and steals a postal money order may: 
( 1) be tried by a dormitory council, and if found guilty of vio-
lating a rule forbidding theft in the dormitory, he may then be 
fined or expelled from the dormitory as otherwise provided by the 
dormitory rule; 
( 2) be tried by the college judicial board, and if found guilty 
of violating a rule forbidding theft, he may then be fined, suspended, 
expelled, or otherwise disciplined as provided in the college rules; 
( 3) be tried in the municipal court for theft, and if convicted he 
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to local ordinance; 
( 4) be tried in the superior court for theft, and if convicted he 
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to state statute; 
( 5) be tried in federal court for theft, and if convicted he may 
then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to federal statutes appli-
cable to postal money orders. 
We accept this scheme of multiple trials and multiple punish-
ments for a single offense in spite of the constitutional provision 
that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy ... for the 
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same offense." Our understanding is, rather, that there were five 
different offenses in this one event and the student was tried and 
punished only once for each offense, even allowing that he per-
formed but a single act and endured an accumulation of five trials 
and five punishments.39 Since each community has a separate legis-
lative capacity of its own over its own territory, the aggregation of 
trials and punishments results without constitutional objection be-
cause the student was, while living in one place, a resident of five 
communities with each overlapping all the lesser ones within it. 
Yet, as we look again at this situation, some parts of the ar-
rangement may lead us to conclude that we have sacrificed the 
substance of the double jeopardy clause to the mere form of manipul-
able laws. As between the municipal and state prosecutions for theft 
under identically worded laws (except that the municipal law ap-
plies only to theft committed within the town whereas the state 
law applies whether or not the theft was committed within a town), 
for instance, why do we permit more than one trial to be held? 
(Note, of course, that the defendant might first have been acquitted 
in the state trial and then convicted in the municipal trial or vice 
versa.) What purpose is served, assuming the defendant is convicted 
in each trial, by allowing multiple sentences to be imposed and even 
consecutively (rather than concurrently) served? Should we have had 
even another trial and another prison sentence consecutively added, 
had the county board of supervisors also adopted a countywide theft 
ordinance? 
We recoil from such an endless proliferation of cruel and point-
less trials and punishments, I think, instinctively recognizing an 
essential unfairness to any person haplessly packed from court to 
court.40 We would tend to say, rather, that more than a single trial 
and punishment ought not befall a man for a single act unless: 
( 1) there are clear and distinct interests peculiar to each com-
39 Overlapping and consecutive state and federal prosecutions have been upheld by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 ( 1959); Bartkus v. 
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Over-
lapping and consecutive state and municipal prosecutions have also been upheld by 
a number of state supreme and inferior federal courts. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rei. 
Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 1967) ; State v. Tucker, 137 
Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926). 
40 The problem of multiple state and subs tate prosecutions for a single act is compre-
hensively reviewed and smartly challenged in Comment, Constitutional Law: Succes-
sive Municipal and State Prosecutions Found Permissible Despite Assumed Applica-
tion of Double Jeopardy Clause, 1968 DuKE L.J. 362. The footnotes to that Com-
ment collect so much of the professional writing and cases that further documentation 
is dispensed with here. The author argues that consecutive state and local prosecutions 
within a single state for a single act may violate the double jeopardy clause- a propo-
sition which arguably might extend to penalties imposed by state universities 
assuming, however, that the proceeding is in fact quasi-criminal and seeks only to 
vindicate public interests already wholly vindicated in some prior state or municipal 
penal action. 
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munity which seeks separately to impose its own jurisdiction over 
the alleged offender; and 
(2) these distinctive interests have not in fact been adequately 
fulfilled in the trial and punishment process of any of the other 
communities previously asserting jurisdiction over the alleged 
offender. 
In our postal money order theft, for instance, it is difficult to 
see any distinctive interest held by the city which is not held equally 
by the county, and any held by the county not held equally by the 
state. It would seem better that a single prosecution be held under 
either the ordinance or the state theft statute (but not under both), 
therefore, and that the common interests of these three overlapping 
communities in the safety of their residents and protection of their 
property be composed in that one proceeding. Similarly, while the 
federal government might originally have had in theory a distinctive 
interest of its own in protecting postal services as a federal instru-
mentality, wholly apart from any concern for the safety of persons 
or property in any given state, a fair trial has incidentally discharged 
the function of the federal statute as well. An additional federal 
prosecution would now seem purely cumulative and vindictive, vio-
lating the spirit if not the technical form of double jeopardy.41 
So, indeed, it may be in the relation of parietal college rules 
and state laws, especially where the college has a purely duplicative 
rule that quite literally presumes to make an academic offense of 
anything forbidden by any local, state, or federal law. Assuming 
that a student drives too fast on the interstate highway, for instance, 
the hazards for which he is responsible by his conduct are already 
policed by the general speeding law he has violated; to the extent 
that the college would discourage speedy driving for the very same 
reasons, e.g., to protect the lives and safety of others, it has no 
interests sufficiently different from those already reflected in the 
general speeding law so to warrant its piling on a separate prosecu-
tion and punishment. Indeed, where the reckless driving occurred 
away from campus, the college itself has no separate community 
interest of its own any more than the town has a proper basis for 
41 I think double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit 
of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Four-
teenth Amendment .... 
. . . Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being prose-
cuted, this notion [of multiple sovereignty} is too subtle for me to grasp. 
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns" 
to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger 
is surely no less when the power of State and Federal Governments is 
brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sover-
eigns" proceeds alone. 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-51, 155 (1959) (Black,]., dissenting). 
1968 STUDENT AS UNIVERSITY RESIDENT 601 
assuming criminal jurisdiction under municipal ordinances for reck-
less driving offenses occurring beyond municipal limits. Where the 
reckless driving occurs within campus precincts, moreover, all appro-
priate college concerns may still be adequately fulfilled in the treat-
ment of the alleged offender in the course of his trial in the munici-
pal court. Thus, application of a college rule to offenses committed 
on campus might appropriately await the determination of the 
municipal court proceedings. 
What I mean to propose by this suggestion is a serious, three-
step reevaluation of the very great number of college rules which 
overlap local, state, and federal laws; rules, for instance, broadly 
punishing vandalism, theft, assault, drug use, and alcohol abuse. The 
first step requires a review of the college rules to determine whether 
they are, in their subject matter and scope of application, justified 
in terms of a clearly discernible college purpose not already com-
posed in other laws applicable to the conduct in question; or wheth-
er, to the contrary, the college rule merely duplicates what may cer-
tainly be appropriate police interests, but interests already covered 
in general law. (In this connection, the locus of the offense may be 
important. Vandalism of the college library, for instance, specifically 
affecting college property, does a kind of damage distinct to the 
college itself apart from the shared community concern to deter 
criminal behavior.42 Vandalism of a downtown shop does not di-
rectly injure the college, and the wrongfulness of the act as an 
offense to the community is readily punishable under existing local 
or state law.) 
The second step is to determine whether a college rule which 
has an a priori basis to protect the college itself nonetheless ought 
not be applied to a given infraction because an overlapping local 
or state law has already been applied in such a fashion that the 
functions of the college rule have been discharged in the regular, 
off-campus proceeding. For instance, the student who allegedly 
vandalized the college library may have been arrested, tried, and 
acquitted or convicted and punished. If he were acquitted, the college 
should surely think carefully about the wisdom of trying him again. 
If he were convicted, the college should surely consider carefully 
whether the punishment imposed was sufficient even in terms of 
42 Arguably, however, the damage "distinct"' to the college is civil rather than criminal, 
since the criminal aspect is already fully reflected in the general criminal law which 
makes vandalism a punishable offense. Thus, the college might appropriately confine 
itself to seeking compensation in the same manner as anyone else. through a common 
law tort action. Even when the criminal mischief is against the college"s own property, 
therefore, it is arguable that the college should not necessarily utilize its own qua>i-
criminal processes to duplicate those already brought to bear by the municipal or 
state court. 
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the college's own interests- making it inappropriate to pursue the 
matter further. 48 
As to this second step, many colleges have operated in an 
utterly different fashion; where college rules and state laws have 
overlapped, a number of colleges have established working relations 
with the downtown police so that the alleged offender is released 
to the college and favored in this regard over nonstudents arrested 
under identical circumstances. This, of course, is the seemingly 
benevolent edge of in loco parentis, the college acting to favor its 
students, shielding them from responsibilities unequally borne by 
nonstudents less favored than they. (The benevolence may some-
times be only a "seeming" one, however, for the college, seeking 
to maintain the goodwill of the police, may in fact then discipline 
the student far more severely than would the court downtown- as 
by expelling him and terminating his educational career, rather 
than by imposing the fine or brief term in jail that he would have 
received downtown.) These arrangements seem to be so doubtful, 
both in terms of their legal correctness and in terms of their educa-
tional wisdom, however, that they should now be reconsidered. They 
are legally doubtful to the extent that the police, by such arrange-
ments, unequally favor those who are fortunate enough to be stu-
dents. They are educationally doubtful, for some students may 
acquire an "elitest'' notion of themselves, placing themselves above 
other citizens, while others may feel that they are made whipping 
boys within the college in order that the college may preserve its 
good standing with the town. On both accounts, the practice should 
be seriously reviewed. 
This does not mean that the college should take no interest 
in its students involved with the courts; the fact that the student 
may be far from home, in need of counsel, and practically disad-
vantaged in comparison with a local resident may of course make 
it perfectly appropriate for the college to assist him in his difficulty 
- short of buying off the police by promising suitably stringent 
treatment of its own. 
There is, however, a third step in this review. Some off-campus 
offenses, not themselves more detrimental to the college than to 
the larger community which polices them, may nonetheless raise 
appropriate questions for independent review within the college-
questions respecting the continuing safety of the college itself. The 
crime of selling narcotics is sometimes committed by persons who 
are themselves addicted and who engage in proselytizing others to 
43 Since a fine paid into court is neither measured by the damage done nor paid over to 
the college, however, I do not mean to imply that the college ought not seek com· 
pensation from the student on the same terms that it might seek compensation from 
anyone else similarly doing damage. See note 42 supra. 
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secure funds to meet their own needs as well as, in some cases, to 
lessen their own feelings of guilt by providing themselves with 
reassurance that others will also use narcotics. A person tried and 
convicted in a regular court of law may, as a youthful first offender, 
be given a suspended sentence and then be free to return at 
once to college. Yet, the college may need to satisfy itself that the 
young man's return to campus will not carry an unreasonable risk 
to other students, and the college might therefore wish to make an 
independent inquiry to determine the safety of allowing the student 
to remain on campus. In short, since the municipal court's exercise 
of judicial discretion in the treatment of a given offender need not 
have given special attention to distinct college interests, the com-
mission by a student of certain types of crimes may make it appro-
priate that the college review the circumstances to determine whether 
separate protective measures of its own would be warranted. 
The shift in emphasis, however, is both real and important. 
Colleges would no longer undertake to duplicate general law by 
taking their own pound of flesh through expelling every student 
convicted of a criminal offense, nor would they seek to under-
mine the accountability of their residents to regular law by providing 
them an academic sanctuary for offenses committed in the larger 
community. Rather, they would leave the policing of municipal 
concerns to the municipal authorities, assisting their students only 
to insure their fair and equal treatment in the regular courts, and 
utilizing such information as they otherwise receive about criminal 
law violations only to determine whether, in the nature of the 
student's conduct and the delay or result reached in the regular 
courts, there is some substantial need of the college requiring 
separate action by the college to secure its own safety. 
III. S~CIAL REGULATION OF DRESS AND DECORUM 
An increasing number of campus controversies are now astir 
which scholars may feel to be too foolish for serious consideration, 
disputes where the complaint of the students seems trivial and the 
concern of the college seems petty. Where the issue is thus one of 
determining whether the triviality of the complaint outweighs the 
pettiness of the rule, no one is likely to secure anything in which 
he can take much pride. Yet, the controversy will not go away, and 
even the examination of a small matter may yield principles capable 
of more important uses. Thus, it may be worth our time briefly 
to take stock of seemingly prankish students who increasingly 
affront social regulations on campus by getting out of step: boys 
with long hair, girls with short skirts, and other departures of 
questioned taste. Cases have been litigated in state and federal courts 
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where students, suspended until they conform, have fielded solemn 
principles of the Constitution in defense of an inch or two more 
of hair or an inch or two less of skirt. Some have tied their beards 
to the first amendment, claiming that their hair length expresses a 
point of view about society, that it constitutes hirsute advocacy of 
more individuality, less conformity, and is, as such, a manifestation 
of free speech as much protected from censorship as conventional 
political discussion. Others anchor their claim in a larger freedom 
of personality, a right to be let alone and to be as one wants to be, 
free of regulation which serves no discernible important purpose 
and reduces the individual to another conforming cardboard cutout 
jigging up and down in a ticky-tacky college.44 
Those issues litigated with respect to high school students have 
generally been resolved against the students,45 although a few recent 
successes46 in the courts are doubtless being watched somewhat 
nervously with the understandable anxiety that there seems to be no 
stopping point for the ubiquitous judiciary. Generally, they have 
lost in court as a practical matter probably because the courts have 
felt that student obstinacy on such slight matters was itself an un-
reasonable and pertinacious challenge to authority. A federal district 
court, it might be said, surely has more important things to do than 
consume its time in behalf of beatniks and mods. In defending these 
cases, the colleges have likewise fielded high principles, including 
the following: 
( 1) Social regulations are designed to contribute affirmatively 
to the atmosphere of serious study and contemplation appropriate 
to an institution of higher learning. Each institution is itself the 
best judge of the environment most conducive to its educational 
undertakings, and its expertise on the inappropriateness of certain 
offensive practices surely ought not be second-guessed by judges 
having little idea of a given campus situation. 
( 2) Were courts to intervene against the institution's own best 
44 These and other arguments are enthusiastically developed in student writing: Com· 
ment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 
( 1968); Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students- The Abuse of a Protected 
Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REv. 104 (1967). See also 19 MERCER L REv. 252 (1968); 
37 U. CoLO. L. REv. 492 (1965). 
45 For cases upholding the school's position, even when there has been virtually no evi· 
dence that the offending style in fact caused disruption to the educational routine see 
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), 
affd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 
1967); Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So. 2d 629 (1962); Leonard v. School 
Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 ( 1965). 
46 The most important case involves reinstatement of a public school teacher transr ~rred 
out of the school because he continued to sport a well-trimmed beard in ddi:cncc of 
the principal's ban. As the court noted, as an aside, the successful teach~r wa; teach-
ing at John Muir High School which had been named after the well-bearded naturalist. 
Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
See also Zachry v. Brown, Civil No. 66-719 (N.D. Ala., June 30, 1967). 
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judgment, moreover, the implied rebuke to the college would itself 
undermine the degree of respect which teachers and administrators 
must maintain if they are to function effectively on campus. 
( 3) Certain modes of dress, like certain modes of speech, are 
forbidden simply because they detract from minimum good manners 
which even a liberal college may surely expect as a part of its 
academic life style. Sometimes it is even clear that a student assumes 
some weird appearance simply to see how much he can get away 
with. Under such circumstances, a failure to recognize what is gen-
uinely involved may undermine the institution and inadvertently 
lead students to a destructive emulation of campus vagrants or 
beatniks, impressing them with the audacity of persons who express 
contempt for education and leading them into a similarly contemp-
tuous view of life. Just as the high school tough may mislead a 
great number of other youngsters by humiliating a teacher with 
a crude epithet or two, so can a college be undermined, it may be 
feared, by the appearance as well as the actuality of free-wheeling 
sex and vagrancy on campus. 
As a lawyer, I expect that the courts generally will continue 
to keep hands off in this area, even though the sanction a college 
may employ to enforce its social regulations continues to be the 
tough sanction of suspension until the student alters his offending 
style. Though the penalty may seem to hurt a matter of great im-
portance to the student- his ability to complete his education -
the fact that it can be so easily avoided by yielding on so trivial a 
matter as visiting a barber makes it difficult to foresee serious con-
stitutional injunctions issuing from the federal courts. 
As an educator, however, I think we may badly misconstrue 
the impact of rules which do not so much cultivate a high academic 
life style as they frankly communicate to our students a degree of 
peevishness, thin-skinned intolerance, and staid prejudice enforced 
by supererogatory regulations. There is not only a generation gap, 
but a far more disturbing educational gap; the teaching of John 
Stuart Mill in the classroom but the preachments of Anthony Com-
stock in our rules. Students are quick to note what we sometimes 
prefer to deny even to ourselves, because its frank admission would 
be so disturbing: it is more usually the case that restrictions such 
as those on long hair for men and miniskirts on girls exist because 
such styles are merely unsettling to us and not in the least dis-
ruptive to the school; they offend our taste, challenge ottr own 
cultural conventions of manliness or, with the girls, lead to stray 
thoughts of which we (or at least some of us) were taught to be 
ashamed. Indeed, the adamant attitude of a college in pressing so 
small a matter so very hard itself creates the confrontation 'vhich 
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sponsors the only real commotion,47 which frequently martyrs the 
nonconforming student and alienates others who are warranted in 
resenting institutional police practices. Unless adventures in campus 
caparisons reach such exaggerated proportions and unless material 
evidence is forthcoming that freakish fashions are actually disrupting 
classes or otherwise directly interfering with the academic program 
(conditions I do not know to have obtained anywhere as yet), we 
may indeed presume too far on the private lives of our students by 
regimenting their tastes. The student may reside on campus, of 
course, but when was it ever well argued that a community- much 
less a free and scholarly one- could properly regiment the dress of 
its residents? 
IV. "CRIME AND PUNISHMENT" 
"My object all sublime 
I shall achieve in time 
To make the punishment fit the crime 
The punishment fit the crime." 
-The Mikado 
We have known for a long time that the sanctions employed 
by our regular criminal law- usually fine or jail- are frequently 
unimaginative and unduly inflexible. Yet, our general scheme of 
sanctions in our colleges is less imaginative by far, as it traditionally 
has tended indiscriminately to employ an academic death penalty 
as the preferred sanction for offenses which may have little or 
nothing in common with each other or with academic fitness. The 
"death penalty" in this sense is, of course, expulsion. Its necessary 
effect is to terminate the individual's academic status, even though 
the offense to which the sanction is tied represents neither academic 
failure nor academic misconduct on the student's part. 
If the student has failed to perform minimally acceptable aca-
demic work, or if he has violated fundamental standards respecting 
the integrity of that work (as by plagiarism or cheating), it may 
not be inappropriate for the college to reconsider his fitness as a 
scholar. If his misbehavior is more essentially in the abuse of some 
privilege he entertains as a resident or citizen on campus, however, 
surely it may be better to fashion deterrent or corrective sanctions 
which adequately respond to that variety of misconduct but which 
do not terminate his academic status. Suppose, for instance, that 
the college maintains a bowling alley in the student union, and that 
47 See 3 HARV. LEGAL CoMM. 1 (1966). 
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a given student badly abuses the equipment. Is it really appropriate 
to regard this as so far reflecting on his scholarship that one should 
seriously consider suspending him- action which keeps him not 
merely from the recreational facility he has abused but from the 
classroom from which he may need further benefit and where he 
has not misconducted himself? Shouldn't a suspension of his bowling 
privileges, rather than his educational interests, be more responsive? 
If the misconduct is aggravated, wouldn't it still be better to require 
either that he make monetary restitution for the damage he has 
done or, if he lacks funds, that he be obliged to work off the cost 
of the repair than to suspend or expel him from the college with 
all the crippling effects that these penalties may have? 
The suggestion for a more discriminating treatment of dis-
ciplinary sanctions, reserving the academic sanction only for aca-
demic offenses except in the extraordinary case of residential 
misbehavior which is so repeated that its repetition finally requires 
removal of the student, can be readily expanded. The student 
determined to have violated a rule respecting drinking in the dormi-
tories may surely be adequately rebuked and others adequately 
deterred by the temporary suspension of significant social privileges. 
One might even be so enlightened as to suggest some counselling 
-even to require it if drinking appears to be a regular problem 
for the student. Whatever his offense to the rules and mores of the 
dormitory, however, it is difficult to see the wisdom of suspending 
him with its necessary effect of withdrawing educational oppor-
tunities. 
Even in the aggravated "residential" case, e.g., the case of a 
student chronically raucous in a dormitory, the offense is more 
accurately to others in the dormitory and it may, at most, be more 
responsive to evict him merely from that facility than to evict him 
from the classrooms as well, where he has committed no offense. 
To be sure, the student may endure a degree of hardship in finding 
lodgings elsewhere- but not so much as though the university gave 
him no opportunity to try as by expelling him. 
There is no point in proliferating examples or illustrating still 
further varieties of disciplinary responses beyond the tired, harsh, 
and inessential preference for suspension or expulsion, but there may 
be some point in bringing the matter back to our subject of the 
student as resident. To the very extent that a student's offense is 
dehors the academic process and is indeed an offense only against 
the nonacademic, social, residential aspects of the college com-
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munity, a response not needlessly jeopardizing the student's aca-
demic career should surely be found. 48 
V. CAMPUS DISORDERS 
The anticipated conclusion to this article was interrupted as 
a result of a massive student vigil which developed in support of 
a strike by the nonacademic employees at Duke University. The 
ensuing month was wholly occupied by efforts to resolve the dispute, 
and the manuscript remained unfinished at the time this symposium 
was held in Denver. In the course of the symposium itself, it be-
came even clearer that student interests had expanded well beyond 
conventional concerns for student freedom and that a growing 
number of universities were more urgently concerned with developing 
ways and means to cope with extralegal and illegal direct student 
action aimed at two newer objectives: first, modification of pro-
grams within the university itself; second, use of the university as 
an instrumentality of social change in the outside community. 
Major confrontations at a number of universities within the 
past 3 years and similar conflicts that must realistically be antici-
pated elsewhere in the immediate future, surely suggest that some 
effort should be made in this symposium to treat these new dimen-
sions of student power. While this issne is not one where a law 
professor has any special claim (especially since neither the student 
mode of action nor the accommodations they seek are typically 
grounded in any legal claim), still something useful might be 
offered even by way of amateur observation. In lieu of the ordinary 
conclusion, and drawing from significantly related sources such 
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders, as well as from reports made within a number of the uni-
versities thus far involved in these confrontations, I would offer the 
following suggestions. 
The accommodation of extralegal crises on campus seems to 
me to involve three stages of concern of which the most important 
(and the most neglected) is the first stage: ( 1) the avoidance of 
extralegal conflict; ( 2) the response to unavoidable conflict; and 
( 3) provision for the immediate and long term aftermath. Much 
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
48 The point is further developed in UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, REPORT OF THE SEN-
ATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS 5 (Dec. 9, 1966) (mimeographed): 
""In formulating the recommendations v:hich follow, the Committee first identified 
five sep:~rate areas of student-university contract: 1) the student as a scholar, 2) the 
student as a tenant, 3) the student as a member of a student organization, 4) the 
student as an employee, and 5) the student as a customer for goods and services. 
Only in the first of these areas can the University appropriately apply its distinctive 
disciplinary punishments (such as suspensions and expulsion) ...... See also Gold-
mGn, Tbe University and The Liberty Of Its Swdents- A Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY. 
L.J. 643 ( 1966) 0 
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orders concludes that urban rioting resulted almost predictably from 
the neglect of persistent community conditions, it also now appears 
that a number of riotous student demonstrations might equally never 
have materialized but for the neglect of certain institutional con-
ditions. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, large-scale institutions 
might at least consider a nun1ber of steps open to them, both for their 
own merits as well as for the defusing of radical movements. 
( 1) Careful, systematic, and joint student-administrative-faculty 
review of basic institutional practices, policies, and structures, with 
immediate attention to any matters which have been the subject of 
persistent rumor or complaint. There is doubtless some real basis 
for the student view that our large-scale institutions have grown 
without any particular direction or philosophy. The absence of any 
readily available, responsive, working, representative, and respected 
group with influence and concern has surely contributed to the felt 
need for dramatic direct action. There is reason to believe that the 
special appointment of representative ad hoc bodies granted special 
influence may be necessary at least for the short term. 
(2) Revitalizing of established means influentially to express 
grievances and effect recommendations. Student governments may 
have failed in the main because they are correctly perceived as "jock-
strap" governments, play parliaments which lack authority, which 
are identified by impotence, which turn off the socially estranged 
student, and which therefore cannot be expected to serve as a steam 
valve which students will use harmlessly to ventilate their concerns. 
For student government to "work" it must almost certainly be 
granted nontrivial responsibility. A profile of its representatives need 
to be included in regular university decisionmaking bodies, both for 
the positive inputs they can provide and for the value of their own 
informal feedback to the student body. 
(3) Revitalization of faculty participation. Faculty senates or 
councils must themselves be restored to influential authority with 
full participating membership on all major university committees. 
Such schemes already exist as a matter of form at many institutions, 
of course, and a great deal of the difficulty here is not one of 
structure but incentive. It is currently unrealistic to expect significant 
faculty service in the policy and planning aspects of large-scale 
institutions to the extent that such service proceeds on the faculty 
member's own time, receives no tangible recognition, distracts from 
publication or teaching, and thus confronts each faculty member 
purely as a "sacrifice." In short, incentives must simply be reordered 
to include institutional service if essential, competent, and responsible 
faculty participation is to be secured. 
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( 4) Revision of clear and defensible rules on matters of sub-
stance and procedure. The typical lack of college rules clearly and 
fairly defining permissible and impermissible forms of action, the 
use of draconian "good conduct" rules, and the lack of fair and 
respected disciplinary procedures doubtless engender some contempt, 
a great deal of confusion, and a complete inability to cope with 
real conflict when it does arise. The inertia of colleges systematically 
to review their rules systems is, in my opinion, more responsible 
than any other single factor for the trend toward judicial inter-
vention in student-college relations. 
Urgent attention to long-neglected problems, improved com-
munication to identify problems, to dispel rumors, and to benefit 
from inputs and feedbacks, the increased sharing of nontrivial 
responsibility with a reordering of incentives to make faculty par-
ticipation useful, and the reformulation of rules to achieve fairness 
and credibility are minimal steps easily within the capacity of most 
universities to pursue at once. Because of the always present likeli-
hood that an unforeseen confrontation may develop in spite of 
these measures, the college should of course make provision for 
emergency meetings with student, faculty, administrative, trustee, 
and employee organizations on very short notice. Otherwise, mis-
information is bound to spread and dramatic direct action is more 
likely to materialize to fill the vacuum. 
The second level of concern is with the crisis that occurs in 
spite of one's best efforts to alleviate grievances and provide orderly 
means of change. The management of such crises becomes a matter 
of strategy, of course, but fairness and credibility are themselves 
the most critical elements of a strategy determined to minimize the 
conflict. 
( 1) Cautious and Firm Initial Reaction. Gross overreaction 
to trivial rules' violations has generally resulted in an enlargement 
of the crisis by submerging the original issue beneath a newer issue 
of brutality and unfairness. An announced willingness promptly to 
review the issue sponsored by the ad hoc group, with a request that 
it be placed in those decision-sharing bodies regularly established 
(as suggested supra), plus firm reference to the need for deliberate 
review rather than unconsidered action based solely on unilateral 
pressure, and a reference to the consequences of anarchy both in 
terms of its inherent inconsistency with the academic process and its 
seriousness under fair rules established with participation by the 
student body, may give the demonstration pause or at least isolate 
it and deprive it of means to secure broad support. Firmness in the 
use of principled sanctions must be maintained, however, if the 
basic and wholly defensible request for minimum order is to achieve 
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respect and credibility. While reasonable persons may disagree, I 
have seen little evidence that abusive force can be let go without 
the use of sanctions credible enough to indicate that the commitment 
to basic order is itself strongly felt and will not be set aside simply 
to avoid unpleasantness. Where possible, infractions of the rules 
should be noticed and cases processed through established pro-
cedures, without more. A sensible rules system will, however, also 
provide for interim suspension (subject always to orderly review) 
when, in the judgment of the highest administrative officer, the 
safety of others or the maintenance of minimum order requires it. 
If the personnel resources of the institution are manifestly insuffi-
cient to cope with those who would clearly paralyze the institution 
unless removed, then it may be reasonable as a last recourse that 
the students answer to the law, as may any other citizen, through 
the use of an ex parte injunction and requests for assistance from 
the police, with a credible followthrough willingness to sign com-
plaints and attend the civil courts. 
The third stage, the aftermath, may itself fall into three parts. 
The first of these is the followthrough with respect to alleged 
rules' violations and infractions of law to determine the appropriate 
treatment of each participant and the conditions under which he 
may resume his academic career. The second is to review the subject 
of the crisis itself, both in terms of the possible merit of the 
grievance it sought to dramatize and what it may indicate in terms 
of a larger structural inadequacy that gave rise to such disorderly 
action. And the third is to review the institution's overall situation 
in light of stresses or weaknesses uncovered in the confrontation 
which has just transpired. The last is doubtless as important as any-
thing else, if an unfortunate history is not to repeat itself. 
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